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Commentators have raised concerns about the empty creditor problem that arises when a debtholder
has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy.
We analyze this problem from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited
commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without credit default swaps (CDS). We
show that CDS, and the empty creditors they give rise to, have important ex-ante commitment benefits:
By strengthening creditors' bargaining power they raise the debtor's pledgeable income and help reduce
the incidence of strategic default. However, we also show that lenders will over-insure in equilibrium,
giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy. We discuss a number of remedies
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moehmke@columbia.eduOne of the most signi￿cant changes in the debtor-creditor relationship in the past few years
has been the creation and subsequent exponential growth of the market for credit insurance, in
particular credit default swaps (CDS). An important aspect of this development is that credit
insurance with CDS does not just involve a risk transfer to the insurance seller. It also signi￿cantly
alters the debtor-creditor relation in the event of ￿nancial distress, as it partially or fully separates
the creditor￿ s control rights from his cash-￿ ow rights. Legal scholars (Hu and Black (2008a,b)) and
￿nancial analysts (e.g. Yavorsky (2009)) have raised concerns about the possible consequences of
such a separation, arguing that CDS may create empty creditors￿ holders of debt and CDS￿ who
no longer have an interest in the e¢ cient continuation of the debtor, and who may push the debtor
into ine¢ cient bankruptcy or liquidation:
￿Even a creditor with zero, rather than negative, economic ownership may want to
push a company into bankruptcy, because the bankruptcy ￿ling will trigger a contractual
payo⁄ on its credit default swap position.￿ , Hu and Black (2008a), pp.19.
We argue in this paper that while a creditor with a CDS contract may indeed be more reluctant
to restructure debt of a distressed debtor, it does not necessarily follow that the presence of CDS
will inevitably lead to an ine¢ cient outcome. In a situation where the debtor has limited ability to
commit to repay his debt, a CDS strengthens the creditor￿ s hand in ex-post debt renegotiation and
thus may actually help increase the borrower￿ s debt capacity. The relevant question is thus whether
the presence of CDS leads to debt market outcomes in which creditors are excessively tough even
after factoring in these ex-ante commitment bene￿ts of CDS.
In a CDS, the protection seller agrees to make a payment to the protection buyer in the event
of a credit event on a prespeci￿ed reference asset. In exchange for this promised payment, the
protection seller receives a periodic premium payment from the buyer. The credit event may be
the bankruptcy ￿ling of the debtor, non-payment of the debt, and in some CDS contracts, debt
restructuring or a credit-rating downgrade. In most cases the default payment is given by the
di⁄erence between the face value of the debt due and the recovery value, which is estimated based
on market prices over a prespeci￿ed period after default has occurred (typically 30 days), or is
based on a CDS settlement auction. Settlement of the contract can be a simple cash payment or it
may involve the exchange of the defaulted bond for cash.
1We formally analyze the e⁄ects of CDS in a limited-commitment model of credit to determine
both the ex-ante and ex-post consequences of default insurance on debt outcomes. In our model,
a ￿rm has a positive net present value investment project, which it seeks to ￿nance by issuing
debt. However, similar to Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996),
we assume that the ￿rm faces a limited commitment problem when writing ￿nancial contracts:
it cannot credibly commit to pay out cash ￿ ows in the future, since realized cash ￿ ows are not
veri￿able and thus not enforceable in court. As is standard in these models, non-payment can
occur for two reasons: First, when interim cash ￿ ows are insu¢ cient to cover contractual payments
a lender may be unable to pay for liquidity reasons. Second, when cash ￿ ows are su¢ cient to
cover contractual payments but the borrower refuses to pay in full to divert cash ￿ ows to himself,
non-payment occurs for strategic reasons.
The central insight of our model is that by raising the creditor￿ s bargaining power, CDS act as a
commitment device for borrowers to pay out cash ￿ ows. That is, when creditors are insured through
CDS they stand to lose less in default and therefore are less forgiving in debt renegotiations. As
a result, creditors are generally able to extract more in debt renegotiations, and borrowers have
less of an incentive to strategically renegotiate down their debt repayments to their own advantage.
However, instances may also arise in which protected creditors are unwilling to renegotiate with
the debtor, even though renegotiation would be e¢ cient. This leads to incidence of Chapter 11
even though a debt exchange or workout would be preferable.
There is growing anecdotal evidence for this CDS-induced shift in bargaining power from debtors
to creditors.1 In 2001-02, not long after the creation of CDS markets, Marconi, the British telecoms
manufacturer, was unable to renegotiate with a syndicate of banks, some of which had purchased
CDS protection. Marconi was eventually forced into a debt-for-equity swap that essentially wiped
out equity holders.2 In 2003, Mirant Corporation, an energy company based in Atlanta, sought
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection when it was unable to work out a deal with its creditors, many
of which had bought credit protection. Remarkably, the bankruptcy judge in this case took the
unusual step of appointing a committee to represent the interests of equity holders in Chapter 11
(typically, once a company enters Chapter 11 equity holders lose all claims on the ￿rm). In the
1Table 1 provides a selective summary of instances in which empty creditors may have played a role in restructuring.
2See, for example, "Liar￿ s Poker," The Economist, May 15th 2003.
2judge￿ s opinion there was a reasonable chance that the reorganization value would be high enough
to allow equity holders to obtain a positive claim after making all creditors whole, suggesting that
the reason for the ￿ling was an empty creditor problem, and not an economic insolvency.3
More recently, the issue of empty creditors resurfaced in the 2009 bankruptcy negotiations of
the US auto companies General Motors and Chrysler, the amusement park operator Six Flags, the
Dutch petrochemicals producer Lyondell Basell, the property investor General Growth Properties,
and the Canadian paper manufacturer Abitibi Bowater, all of which ￿led for Chapter 11 protection
when they were unable to work out deals with their creditors.4 Harrah￿ s Entertainment, the casino
operator, only barely managed to restructure its debt, and, after two failed exchange o⁄ers, the IT
provider Unisys had to give its creditors a particularly sweet deal (bonds worth more than par) to
reschedule debt coming due in 2010.5 Most recently, the trucking company YRC only managed to
restructure its debt at the last minute, when the Teamsters union threatened to protest in front of
the o¢ ces of hold-out hedge funds, which were allegedly blocking YRC￿ s debt-for-equity exchange
o⁄er so as to trigger a default and cash in on more lucrative CDS payments.6
We ￿rst highlight the potential ex-ante bene￿ts of CDS protection as a commitment device in
renegotiations: A key consequence of the stronger bargaining power of creditors with CDS is that
￿rms can increase their debt capacity. This means that in the presence of CDS more positive net
present value projects can receive ￿nancing ex ante. Also, projects that can be ￿nanced also in
the absence of CDS may get more e¢ cient ￿nancing, as the presence of CDS lowers the borrower￿ s
incentive to ine¢ ciently renegotiate down payments for strategic reasons. Taken together, this
implies that under limited commitment CDS can have signi￿cant ex-ante bene￿ts.
This insight leads to a more general point about the economic role of CDS markets. In the
absence of any contractual incompleteness, introducing a CDS market would not lead to gains
from trade in our model, given that both parties involved are risk-neutral. More generally, in
any complete market CDS contracts are redundant securities. This raises the question why CDS
markets exist in the ￿rst place. Our model highlights that, besides reducing the transaction costs of
insurance or risk transfer, CDS introduce gains from contracting by allowing the lender to commit
3See "Shareholders in Mirant Gain Voice in Reorganization," New York Times, September 20, 2003.
4See, for example, "Credit Insurance Hampers GM Restructuring," Financial Times, May 11, 2009; "Burning
Down the House," Economist, May 5 2009; "No Empty Threat," Economist, June 18, 2009.
5On Harrah￿ s and Unysis see "CDS Investors Hold the Cards," Financial Times, July 22, 2009.
6"YRC and the Street￿ s Appetite for Destruction," Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2010.
3not to renegotiate debt unless the renegotiation terms are attractive enough for creditors.
However, despite this bene￿cial role as a commitment device CDS can lead to ine¢ ciencies. The
reason is that when lenders freely choose their level of credit protection, they will generally over-
insure: While the socially optimal choice of credit protection trades o⁄ the ex-ante commitment
bene￿ts that arise from creditors￿increased bargaining power against the ex-post costs of ine¢ cient
renegotiation, creditors do not fully internalize the cost of foregone renegotiation surplus that
arises in the presence of credit insurance. Even when insurance is fairly priced and correctly
anticipates the creditors￿ potential value-destroying behavior after a non-payment for liquidity
reasons, creditors have an incentive to over-insure. This gives rise to ine¢ cient empty creditors
who refuse to renegotiate with lenders in order to collect payment on their CDS positions, even
when renegotiation via an out-of-court restructuring would be the socially e¢ cient alternative.
This over-insurance is ine¢ cient ex post but also￿ and more importantly￿ ex ante. In equilibrium,
the presence of a CDS market will thus produce excessively tough creditors and an incidence of
bankruptcy that is ine¢ ciently high compared to the social optimum.
The legal scholarship (Hu and Black (2008a,b), Lubben (2007)) has mostly focused on the detri-
mental ex-post consequences of empty creditors for e¢ cient debt restructuring. Hence, the resulting
policy proposals regarding the treatment of CDS in and out of bankruptcy risk underestimating
some of the potential ex-ante bene￿ts of CDS markets. In particular, a rule that has the e⁄ect
of eliminating the empty creditor problem altogether, for example by stripping protected creditors
of their voting rights or by requiring the inclusion of restructuring as a credit event in all CDS
contracts, would not be e¢ cient according to our analysis. While such a rule would prevent CDS
protection from inhibiting e¢ ciency-enhancing debt restructuring, it would also eliminate any posi-
tive commitment e⁄ects of CDS for borrowers. A similar e⁄ect would obtain if CDS were structured
like put options, whereby the protection buyer can sell the bond at any time to the protection seller
for a prespeci￿ed price. However, our analysis does suggest that disclosure of CDS positions may
mitigate the ex-ante ine¢ ciencies resulting from the empty creditor problem, without undermining
the ex-ante commitment e⁄ect of CDS. In particular, if public disclosure allows borrowers and
lenders to contract on CDS positions, they may allow the lender to commit not to over-insure once
he has acquired the bond. More generally, public disclosure of positions may also be bene￿cial by
giving investors a more complete picture of creditors￿incentives in restructuring.
4Our paper is part of a growing theoretical literature on CDS and their e⁄ect on the debtor-
creditor relationship. We add to the existing literature by emphasizing the e⁄ects of CDS on
renegotiation between debtors and creditors, and the associated costs and bene￿ts. Much of the
existing literature has focused either on the impact of CDS on banks￿incentives to monitor, or on the
ability of CDS to improve risk sharing. In Du⁄ee and Zhou (2001) CDS allow for the decomposition
of credit risk into components that are more or less information sensitive, thus potentially helping
banks overcome a lemon￿ s problem when hedging credit risk. Thompson (2007) and Parlour and
Winton (2008) analyze banks￿decision to lay o⁄ credit risk via loan sales or by purchasing CDS
protection and characterize the e¢ ciency of the resulting equilibria. Arping (2004) argues that
CDS can help overcome a moral hazard problem between banks and borrowers, provided that CDS
contracts expire before maturity. Parlour and Plantin (2008) analyze under which conditions liquid
markets for credit risk transfer can emerge when there is asymmetric information about credit
quality. Morrison (2005) argues that since CDS can undermine bank monitoring, borrowers may
ine¢ ciently switch to bond ￿nance, thus reducing welfare. Allen and Carletti (2006) show that
credit risk transfer can lead to contagion and cause ￿nancial crises. Stulz (2009) discusses the role
of CDS during the credit crisis of 2007-2009.
Another related literature deals with the decoupling of voting and cash-￿ ow rights in common
equity through the judicious use of derivatives to hedge cash-￿ ow risk. Hu and Black (2006,
2007) and Kahan and Rock (2007) argue that such decoupling can give rise to the opposite voting
preferences from those of unhedged common equity holders and thus to ine¢ cient outcomes, such as
voting for a merger which results in a decline in stock price of the acquirer and pro￿ts those who have
built up short positions on the ￿rm￿ s stock. More recently Brav and Mathews (2009) have proposed
a theory of decoupling in which the hedging of cash-￿ ow risk can facilitate trading and voting by
an informed trader, but where it can also give rise to ine¢ cient voting when hedging is cheap.
In a related study, Kalay and Pant (2008) show that rather than leading to ine¢ cient acquisition
decisions, decoupling allows shareholders to extract more surplus during takeover contests, while
still selling the ￿rm to the most e¢ cient bidder. Zachariadis and Olaru (2010) propose a model in
which a debtholder can trade in a ￿rm￿ s equity after a restructuring proposal has been made, but
before the vote on the proposal takes place. They show that this ability to trade generally raises
the creditor￿ s payo⁄, but can lead to ine¢ cient liquidation when debt and equity markets di⁄er in
5their assessment of the ￿rm￿ s survival probability.
The emerging empirical literature on the e⁄ects of CDS on credit market outcomes supports
our main ￿ndings. For example, Hirtle (2008) shows that greater use of CDS leads to an increase in
bank credit supply and an improvement in credit terms, such as maturity and required spreads, for
large loans that are likely to be issued by companies that are ￿ named credits￿in the CDS market.
Ashcraft and Santos (2007) show that the introduction of CDS has lead to an improvement in
borrowing terms for safe and transparent ￿rms, where banks￿monitoring incentives are not likely
to play a major role.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We outline our limited commitment model of
CDS in Section 1. We then ￿rst analyze the model without CDS (Section 2) and then with CDS
(Section 3). Section 4 extends the model to analyze the e⁄ect of multiple creditors. In Section
5 we discuss the model￿ s implications for policy and optimal legal treatment of CDS. Section 6
concludes.
1 The Model
We consider a ￿rm that can undertake a two-period investment project which requires an initial
investment F at date 0. The project generates cash ￿ ows at dates 1 and 2. At each of those
dates cash ￿ ows can be either high or low. At date 1 the project generates high cash ￿ ow CH
1
with probability ￿, and low cash ￿ ow CL
1 < CH
1 with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Similarly, at date 2 the
project generates CH
2 with probability ￿, and CL
2 < CH
2 with probability 1 ￿ ￿. The realization
of C2 is revealed to the ￿rm at time 1. The project can be liquidated after the realization of the
￿rst-period cash ￿ ow for a liquidation value of L < CL
2 , implying that early liquidation of the
project is ine¢ cient. The liquidation value at date 2 is normalized to zero.
The ￿rm has no initial wealth and ￿nances the project by issuing debt. The debt contract
speci￿es a contractual repayment R at date 1. If the ￿rm makes this contractual payment, it has
the right to continue the project and collect the date 2 cash ￿ ows. If the ￿rm fails to make the
contractual date 1 payment, the creditor has the right to discontinue the project and liquidate
the ￿rm. Liquidation can be interpreted as outright liquidation, as in a Chapter 7 cash auction,
or, more generally, as forcing the ￿rm into Chapter 11 reorganization; for example by ￿ling an
6involuntary bankruptcy petition. In the latter interpretation L denotes the expected payment the
creditor receives in Chapter 11. Both the ￿rm and the creditor are risk neutral, and the riskless
interest rate is zero.
The main assumption of our model is that the ￿rm faces a limited commitment problem when
raising ￿nancing for the project, similar to Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990, 1996). More speci￿cally, we assume that only the minimum date 1 cash ￿ ow CL
1 is veri￿able,
and that all other cash ￿ ows can be diverted by the borrower. In particular, the borrower can
divert the amount CH
1 ￿ CL
1 at date 1 if the project yields the high return CH
1 . This means that
after the date 1 cash ￿ ow is realized the ￿rm can always claim to have received a low cash ￿ ow,
default and pay out CL
1 instead of R. We assume that CL
1 < F, such that the project cannot be
￿nanced with risk-free debt that is repaid at date 1. In fact, it turns out that there is no loss from
normalizing CL
1 to zero, such that for the remainder of the paper we take CL
1 = 0.
We also assume that at date 0 none of the date 2 cash ￿ ows can be contracted upon. One
interpretation of this assumption is that, seen from date 0; the timing of date 2 cash ￿ ows is too
uncertain and too complicated to describe to be able to contract on when exactly payment is due.
At date 1, however, the ￿rm and its initial creditors can make the date 2 cash ￿ ow veri￿able by
paying a proportional veri￿cation cost (1 ￿ ￿)C2, where ￿ 2 (0;1).7 The ability to verify the date
2 cash ￿ ow at date 1 opens the way for potential renegotiation between the ￿rm and its creditor
following non-payment of the date 1 claim R. This has the consequence that the ￿rm may want to
strategically renegotiate down its repayment at date 1.
The main focus of our analysis is the e⁄ect of introducing a market for credit insurance in which
lenders can purchase credit default swaps (CDS) to insure against non-payment of the contractual
date 1 repayment R. We model the CDS market as a competitive insurance market involving risk-
neutral buyers and sellers, in which CDS contracts are priced fairly. Note that in the absence of
any contractual incompleteness there would be no gains from trade in this market given that both
parties are risk-neutral. More generally, in any complete market, CDS contracts are redundant
7For simplicity, we assume that the date 2 cash ￿ ow cannot be made veri￿able to a new creditor. In other words,
existing creditors have an "informational monopoly," as is assumed, for example, in Rajan (1992). The main role of
this assumption is to simplify the way we model to the distribution of the renegotiation surplus between debtor and
creditors. The analysis can be extended to the situation where we drop this assumption. The main change would
involve the debtor sometimes rolling over its debts with the initial creditors by borrowing from new creditors at date
1. In this case initial creditors only obtain R when they could have obtained a higher renegotiation surplus in the
event of a liquidity default.
7securities. Indeed, in practice an implicit assumption in the pricing of these securities is that they
can be costlessly replicated. This, naturally, raises the question why this market exists in the
￿rst place. One explanation is that the CDS allows the parties to save on transaction costs. But
another explanation is the one we propose in this paper, which is that CDS play another role besides
insurance or risk transfer. They introduce gains from contracting arising from the commitment the
lender gains not to renegotiate debt unless the renegotiation terms are attractive enough.
Formally, the CDS is a promise of a payment ￿ by the protection seller to the lender if a ￿ credit
event￿occurs at date 1, against a fair premium f that is paid by the protection buyer to the seller.
We assume that a credit event occurs when the ￿rm fails to repay R and if upon non-payment
the ￿rm and the creditor fail to renegotiate the debt contract to mutually acceptable terms. With
this type of renegotiation we have in mind an out-of-court restructuring, for example through a
debt exchange or a debt-for-equity swap. The assumption that CDS contracts do not pay out after
successful renegotiation re￿ ects what is standard practice in the CDS market. Since the spring of
2009, the default CDS contract as de￿ned by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) does not recognize restructuring as a credit event. Moreover, even for CDS contracts
that recognize restructuring as a credit event, in practice there is often signi￿cant uncertainty for
creditors whether a particular restructuring quali￿es.8 We discuss the di⁄erent ISDA restructuring
clauses and the implications of making restructuring a credit event that triggers the CDS in section
5.3.
If the ￿rm misses its contractual date 1 payment R; two outcomes are possible: either the
lender liquidates the project, forces the ￿rm into bankruptcy, and collects the liquidation value L,
or the lender chooses to renegotiate the debt contract in an out-of-court restructuring. Bankruptcy
is a credit event and triggers the payment ￿ by the protection seller under the CDS contract, so
that the insured lender receives a total payo⁄ of L + ￿ under this outcome. Alternatively, if the
￿rm and lender renegotiate the initial contract in an out-of-court restructuring, they avert costly
bankruptcy (as L < CL
2 ), but the lender does not receive the CDS payment ￿, since an out-of-
court restructuring does not constitute a credit event. A workout also involves costs, as the lender
must verify date 2 cash ￿ ows and pay the veri￿cation cost (1 ￿ ￿)C2, such that the surplus from
8For example, on October 5, 2009, ISDA ruled that an ￿ Alternative Dispute Resolution￿ (ADR) that led to
changes in maturity and principal of Aiful Corporation￿ s debt does not qualify as a bankruptcy event. The ruling
was subsequently overturned. See www.isda.org for more information.
8renegotiation is given by ￿C2 < C2. However, workouts are less costly than bankruptcy, as we
assume that ￿C2 > L. Since for most of our analysis there is not much loss in setting L = 0; we
will make this assumption for the remainder of the paper unless we explicitly state otherwise.
Finally, when renegotiation occurs, the renegotiation surplus is split between the ￿rm and the
lender according to their relative bargaining strengths. We assume that absent CDS, the relative
bargaining strengths in renegotiation are exogenously given by q (for the lender) and 1 ￿ q (for
the ￿rm). In the presence of CDS, however, the relative bargaining positions can change, since
CDS protection increases the lender￿ s outside option. In particular, if the amount the creditor
receives by abandoning negotiation and triggering the CDS exceeds what he would receive as part
of the bargaining game absent CDS, the ￿rm must compensate the creditor up to his level of credit
protection ￿ in order to be able to renegotiate. In the presence of credit protection, the creditor thus
receives the maximum of what he would receive absent CDS and his outside option ￿ generated
by the CDS: max[q￿C2;￿]. Moreover, when ￿ exceeds the available renegotiation surplus ￿C2;
the CDS payment in the event of bankruptcy exceeds what the ￿rm can o⁄er to the creditor in
renegotiation, such that renegotiation becomes impossible. Overall CDS protection thus makes
creditors tougher negotiators in out-of-court restructurings, and in the extreme case may prevent
renegotiation altogether.9
Our model of debt restructuring, while highly stylized captures the broad elements of debt
restructuring in practice. Absent tax and accounting considerations, out-of-court restructuring is
generally seen to be cheaper than a formal bankruptcy procedure.10 Also, the higher the potential
gains from continuation the larger are the due diligence costs incurred in restructuring negotiations,
which is re￿ ected in our assumption of proportional veri￿cation costs.11 As for the e⁄ects of
CDS protection on out-of-court restructurings, our model captures in a simple way the empty
9Formally our bargaining protocol is equivalent to a Nash bargaining outcome in which CDS protection raises
the creditor￿ s outside option, as outlined in Sutton (1986) (page 714). For the relationship between Nash bargaining
and Rubinstein bargaining see also Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986). Note that we could also assume that
instead of receiving max[q￿C2;￿] the protected creditor receives his outside option ￿ plus a share q of the remaining
bargaining surplus. Qualitatively, none of our results would change.
10For example, Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) ￿nd that bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and can reach up
to 20% of assets. Their paper also provides a useful summary of older studies of bankruptcy costs, many of which
￿nd signi￿cant costs of bankruptcy.
11None of the implications of the model depend on proportional veri￿cation costs. Strategic default is costly as
long as veri￿cation costs are positive, whether they are proportional or ￿xed. Moreover, even when there are no
veri￿cation costs, CDS will play a role by strengthening the creditor￿ s role in renegotiation. The di⁄erence is that in
this latter case strategic default is not costly from a welfare perspective.
9creditor e⁄ects that analysts are concerned about. As Yavorsky (2009) argues: ￿While individual
circumstances may vary, we believe that bondholders that own CDS protection are more likely to
take a ￿ hard-line￿in negotiations with issuers.￿
2 Optimal Debt Contracts without CDS
We begin by analyzing the model in the absence of a market for credit insurance. The optimal
debt contract for this case will later serve as a benchmark to analyze the e⁄ects of introducing a
CDS market.
Two types of non-payment of debt can occur in our model. If the low cash ￿ ow realizes at date
1, the ￿rm cannot repay R as it does not have su¢ cient earnings to do so (since F > CL
1 ). We refer
to this outcome as a liquidity default. If the high cash ￿ ow realizes at date 1, the ￿rm is able to
service its debt obligations but may choose not to do so. That is, given our incomplete contracting
assumption, the ￿rm may default strategically and renegotiate with the creditor. In particular,
in the high cash ￿ ow state the ￿rm will make the contractual repayment R only if the following
incentive constraint is satis￿ed:
CH
1 ￿ R + C2 ￿ CH
1 + (1 ￿ q)￿C2: (1)
This constraint says that, when deciding whether to repay R, the ￿rm compares the payo⁄from
making the contractual payment and collecting the entire date 2 cash ￿ ow to defaulting strategically
and giving a fraction q of the renegotiation surplus to the creditor. The ￿rm has an incentive to
make the contractual payment whenever the date 2 cash ￿ ow is su¢ ciently large, while for small
expected future cash ￿ ows the ￿rm defaults strategically.
We ￿rst establish under which conditions the project can be ￿nanced without strategic default
occurring in equilibrium. Since strategic default is costly (￿ < 1), this is the optimal form of
￿nancing whenever it is feasible. From equation (1) we see that the maximum face value that
will just satisfy the incentive constraint for both realizations of the date 2 cash ￿ ow must satisfy
R = CL
2 [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)]. We shall assume that CH
1 ￿ CH
2 [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)] so that the ￿rm can always
pay the incentive compatible repayment R in the high date 1 cash ￿ ow state CH
1 .12 This maximum




2 [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)]. However, we will use the slightly
10value for R in turn implies a maximum ex-ante setup cost consistent with the no strategic default
assumption. We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there is no strategic default. The maximum face value R compatible
with this assumption just satis￿es the incentive constraint
CH
1 + CL
2 ￿ R ￿ CH
1 + ￿CL
2 (1 ￿ q) (2)
yielding a maximum face value consistent with no strategic default of
R = CL
2 [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)]: (3)
The maximum ex-ante setup cost consistent with no strategic default is given by
b F = ￿CL
2 [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿q
￿
￿CH




Proposition 1 states that when the ex-ante setup cost of the project is not too high, the project
can be ￿nanced through a debt contract such that no strategic default will not occur in equilibrium,
even in the absence of CDS contracts. The resulting outcome is e¢ cient: When the ￿rm has
su¢ cient resources at date 1 it chooses to repay, such that the ￿rm only enters costly renegotiation
in the liquidity default state, where it is unavoidable. Moreover, in the liquidity default state
renegotiation, while costly, is e¢ cient and always occurs.
However, ine¢ ciencies arise when the ex-ante setup cost exceeds b F. As we show below, in this
case the project either cannot be ￿nanced at all, or it can only be ￿nanced with strategic default
occurring in equilibrium. The former is ine¢ cient because it implies underinvestment. The latter
is ine¢ cient because renegotiation has a cost, and from an e¢ ciency perspective should only occur
when absolutely necessary, i.e. in the liquidity default state. However, when the ex-ante setup
costs exceeds b F; the face value required for the project to attract funding makes it optimal for the
￿rm to default strategically when the ￿rst-period cash ￿ ow is high and the second-period cash ￿ ow
low. Renegotiation thus occurs even in cases when it is not strictly necessary. This costly strategic
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2 ) the project cannot be ￿nanced when the setup
cost exceeds b F: When ￿ > ￿ there is an interval (b F;F0] for which the project can be ￿nanced with
strategic default arising at date 1 when C2 = CL
2 : This results in an expected ine¢ ciency from
strategic default of
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)CL
2 . (5)
The maximum face value of debt R consistent with strategic default only in the low cash ￿ow state
C2 = CL
2 is given by
R = CH
2 [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)]; (6)
and the maximum ex-ante setup cost for which the project can be ￿nanced with strategic default
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, the project cannot be ￿nanced at all. This is because in
this case there would be systematic strategic default at date 1. That is, the debt obligation R is
so high that in the high date 1 cash ￿ ow state the ￿rm defaults even when the date 2 cash ￿ ow is
CH
2 . This, however, implies that the pledgeable income is insu¢ cient to ￿nance the project. We
thus obtain:




the project cannot be ￿nanced. In this case, strategic
default would always arise when C1 = CH








which is insu¢ cient to ￿nance the project.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are summarized in Figure 1. Jointly they imply that limited commitment
causes two types of ine¢ ciencies. First, it leads to underinvestment relative to the ￿rst best. While
it would be e¢ cient to fund any project for which the expected cash ￿ ows exceed the setup cost,
12Figure 1: The ￿gure illustrates the two possible outcomes absent a CDS market. Either all projects
up to ^ F receive ￿nancing without strategic default and no projects beyond ^ F are ￿nanced (top), or,
when ￿ is su¢ ciently high, there is an additional region ( ^ F;F0] where the project can be ￿nanced
with strategic default occuring in equilibrium.






1 + (1 ￿ ￿)CL
1 + ￿CH
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)CL
2 | {z }
expected cash ￿ows
(9)
can be ￿nanced. Hence limited commitment gives rise to underinvestment relative to the ￿rst-best.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium without a CDS market exhibits underinvestment relative to ￿rst-best.
Second, when F0 exceeds b F, there is a range for setup costs for which the project can be ￿nanced,
but only ine¢ ciently. This is because in this range strategic default occurs in equilibrium, leading
to a deadweight cost since renegotiation takes place even when not strictly necessary.
Corollary 2 When ￿ > ￿; there is a range of ex-ante setup costs (b F;F0] for which the project can
only be ￿nanced ine¢ ciently.
These ine¢ ciencies relative to ￿rst best are a direct consequence of limited commitment. This
highlights the potential bene￿cial e⁄ect of commitment devices. In particular, a direct implication
of Corollaries 1 and 2 is that any mechanism that can serve as a commitment device for the ￿rm
to pledge cash ￿ ows to the creditor can be value-enhancing. In Section 3 we show that CDS can
serve as exactly such a commitment device.
133 Debt, CDS, and the Empty Creditor
We now analyze the e⁄ect of allowing the lender to purchase credit insurance in a fairly priced CDS
market. As we will see, the main e⁄ect of CDS protection is to increase the lender￿ s bargaining
position in renegotiation: In order to induce the lender to accept a renegotiation o⁄er, the ￿rm
must now compensate the lender for the CDS premium he could collect by forcing the ￿rm into
bankruptcy.
The increase in the lender￿ s bargaining power has two e⁄ects. First, when creditors are protected
through CDS, they are generally able to extract more surplus during renegotiation following either
a liquidity default or a strategic default, thus increasing the ￿rm￿ s pledgeable income at date 0.
This is welfare-enhancing since it allows more investment to be undertaken at time 0.
Second, when the ￿rm anticipates lenders to be tougher in renegotiation, this reduces the ￿rm￿ s
incentive to strategically renegotiate down its repayment at date 1. In particular, if the borrower
has a CDS position of size ￿, any out-of-court renegotiation o⁄er must compensate the lender
for the outside option of forcing the ￿rm into bankruptcy and collecting the insurance payment.
This means that when the amount of credit insurance ￿ exceeds q￿C2; the incentive constraint (1)
becomes
CH
1 ￿ R + C2 ￿ CH
1 + max[￿C2 ￿ ￿;0]: (10)
It is easy to see that by reducing the right hand side of this inequality, credit protection lowers
the ￿rm￿ s incentive to default strategically. This second e⁄ect is welfare-enhancing since strategic
renegotiation is costly and should be avoided when possible.
However, when the lender acquires a CDS position this can also lead to situations in which the
creditor is unwilling to renegotiate with the ￿rm even after a liquidity default, when renegotiation
would be e¢ cient given the positive renegotiation surplus of ￿C2. This happens because credit
insurance can turn the lender into an ine¢ cient ￿ empty creditor:￿While still owning control rights,
the creditor with CDS protection is insulated from the potential value destruction that results
from bankruptcy. Renegotiation breaks down when the insurance payout the lender can collect in
bankruptcy is larger than the potential surplus from renegotiating with the ￿rm. This results in
unrealized renegotiation gains and is clearly ex-post ine¢ cient. Moreover, when credit insurance
leads to foregone renegotiation surplus for projects that could have been ￿nanced without sacri￿cing
14renegotiation surplus, it also leads to an ine¢ ciency in an ex-ante sense.
We will analyze the CDS market in two steps. As a benchmark we ￿rst characterize the socially
optimal level of credit insurance. This is the level of credit protection a social planner would set
to maximize overall surplus. In our setting it also coincides with the level of CDS protection the
borrower would choose if he could determine a certain level of credit protection for his lenders.
After establishing this benchmark, we then analyze the lender￿ s choice of credit protection. We
will show that when the lender to freely chooses his CDS position, he generally has an incentive
to over-insure in the CDS market, leading to socially excessive incidence of bankruptcy and lost
renegotiation surplus. This means that our model predicts that a laissez-faire equilibrium in the
CDS market leads to ine¢ ciently empty creditors, even when CDS prices perfectly anticipate the
creditor￿ s ine¢ cient behavior in renegotiation.
3.1 E¢ cient Credit Insurance
What level of credit insurance maximizes surplus? First, it is easy to see that the borrower would
choose a level of credit protection of at least ￿CL
2 . Setting ￿ = ￿CL
2 increases the lender￿ s bargaining
position in renegotiation, while still allowing renegotiation to take place after a liquidity default
when the date 2 cash ￿ ow is low (a fortiori this implies that renegotiation will also occur after a
liquidity default when the date 2 cash ￿ ow is high).
Setting ￿ = ￿CL
2 thus increases the pledgeable cash ￿ ow without sacri￿cing any renegotiation
surplus. The only e⁄ect of CDS protection is to allow creditors to extract more in renegotiation
and to provide a commitment device for the ￿rm not to default strategically. The reduced incentive
to default strategically when the lender has credit protection ￿ = ￿CL
2 means that the highest face
value consistent with no strategic default is now given by R = CL
2 . This follows directly from the
incentive constraint (10). This increase in the maximum value of R consistent with no strategic
default and the creditor￿ s increased bargaining power following a liquidity default translate into a
higher maximum ex-ante setup cost that is consistent with ￿nancing the project without strategic
default.
Proposition 4 It is e¢ cient to choose a level of credit protection of at least ￿ = ￿CL
2 : Then the
highest face value consistent with no strategic default is given by R = CL
2 :This translates into a
15maximum ex-ante setup cost consistent with no strategic default of
e F = ￿CL
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> b F: (11)






, there is an interval (e F; e F0] on which the project can be ￿nanced
with strategic default in equilibrium. In this case R = CH
2 ; and the project can be ￿nanced up to a
maximum ex-ante setup cost of
e F0 = ￿
￿
￿CH
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿CL
2
￿












Proposition 4 illustrates two bene￿ts of CDS markets, which we illustrate in Figure 2. First,
some positive NPV projects that could not attract ￿nancing in the absence of CDS can be ￿nanced
when a CDS market becomes available, since max
h






. This means that the
introduction of CDS extends the set of projects that can attract ￿nancing, thus alleviating the
underinvestment ine¢ ciency. Second, when b F < F0 the presence of CDS protection can reduce
the incidence of strategic default. Projects for which F 2 (b F < F0] can attract ￿nancing even
in the absence of CDS, but only with strategic default in equilibrium. The introduction of CDS
eliminates strategic default and the associated deadweight loss of ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)CL
2 . Introducing
a CDS market can thus make existing projects more e¢ cient and allow for ￿nancing of additional
projects, thus alleviating both ine¢ ciencies outlined in Corollaries 1 and 2. As shown in Proposition
4, if the ex-ante setup cost lies below the threshold max
h
e F; e F0
i
both these e¢ ciency gains are
possible without sacri￿cing any renegotiation surplus.
Corollary 3 CDS have two distinct bene￿ts:
1. CDS increase the set of projects that can receive ￿nancing in the ￿rst place.
2. The presence of CDS eliminates strategic defaults for some projects that can be ￿nanced even
in the absence of CDS.
Could it be e¢ cient to raise the level of CDS protection above ￿CL
2 ? In this case an additional
e⁄ect emerges: the presence of CDS protection may prevent socially desirable renegotiation follow-
ing a liquidity default. More precisely, when the ￿rm renegotiates its debt for liquidity reasons and
16Figure 2: The ￿gure illustrates the two bene￿ts from CDS. If absent CDS the project can be ￿nanced
without strategic default for setup costs up to ^ F and cannot be ￿nanced beyond ^ F; setting ￿ = ￿CL
2
allows ￿nancing without strategic default up to ~ F (top). When absent CDS there is a region ( ^ F;F0]
in which ￿nancing absent CDS involves strategic default, ￿ = ￿CL
2 may allow ￿nancing without
strategic default up to ~ F (middle), or it may eliminate strategic default on ( ^ F; ~ F]; and allow the
￿nancing of new projects (with strategic default) on (F0; ~ F0] (bottom).
the expected date 2 cash ￿ ow turns out to be CL
2 , renegotiation will not occur even though it would
be e¢ cient. The reason is that the maximum the ￿rm can o⁄er to the lender in renegotiation is
￿CL
2 , such that the lender prefers to collect his insurance payment of ￿ > ￿CL
2 . Hence ￿ > ￿CL
2
leads to ine¢ cient renegotiation after liquidity defaults.
However, even despite this loss of renegotiation surplus it may still be e¢ cient to set the level
of CDS protection to ￿CH
2 .13 This is the case when this higher level of credit protection allows a
project to be ￿nanced that could otherwise not be ￿nanced, or if the loss of renegotiation surplus
generated by the high level of credit protection is more than o⁄set by a reduction in the social cost
of strategic default. We will consider these two cases in turn.
First consider the case when e F ￿ e F0: The last project that can be ￿nanced with the low level
of credit protection ￿ = ￿CL
2 is ￿nanced e¢ ciently, i.e. without strategic default. Raising the level
of credit insurance to ￿CH
2 can then only be e¢ cient if the project￿ s setup cost exceeds the critical
value e F, such that the project could not be ￿nanced at all when ￿ = ￿CL
2 . If a setting ￿ = ￿CH
2
13When the level of credit protection exceeds ￿C
L
2 ; it is always optimal to raise it up to ￿C
H
2 to maximize the
e⁄ect of increased bargaining power. Any level beyond ￿C
H
2 will eliminate renegotiation altogether and is strictly
dominated.
17makes su¢ cient cash ￿ ow pledgeable so that a project with a setup cost higher than e F can be
￿nanced, it is ex-ante e¢ cient to do so, even though renegotiation will be impossible in some state
of the world.
Proposition 5 Suppose that e F ￿ e F0: When the ex-ante setup cost exceeds e F it is e¢ cient to set
the level of credit protection to ￿ = ￿CH
2 if this allows the project to be ￿nanced. Raising pledgeable
income beyond e F by increasing the level of credit insurance to ￿ = ￿CH















While this results in expected lost renegotiation surplus of (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿CL
2 it is ex-ante e¢ cient
when F > e F since otherwise the project could not be ￿nanced. The maximum ex-ante setup cost







+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿CH
2 : (14)
Now consider what happens when e F0 > e F: In this case the marginal project that can be ￿nanced
with ￿ = ￿CL
2 involves strategic default. Again it is clearly always e¢ cient to set ￿ = ￿CH
2 when
this allows a project with a setup cost higher than e F0 to be ￿nanced. However, if the cost of
foregone renegotiation surplus is smaller than the cost of strategic default, then it is also optimal
to set ￿ = ￿CH
2 when F 2 (e F; e F0]. As it turns out, the cost of strategic default exceeds the cost of
foregone renegotiation whenever ￿ > ￿:
Proposition 6 Suppose that e F0 > e F: When the ex-ante setup cost exceeds e F0 it is e¢ cient to
set the level of credit protection to ￿ = ￿CH
2 if this allows the project to be ￿nanced. This allows







+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿CH
2
In addition, if ￿ > ￿ it is also e¢ cient to set the level of credit protection to ￿ = ￿CH
2 on the
interval (e F; e F0], if this allows ￿nancing the project without strategic default.
18Figure 3: The ￿gure illustrates when it may be optimal to raise the level of credit protection to
￿ = ￿CH
2 : Either it must allow a project to attract ￿nancing that could not be ￿nanced with
￿ = ￿CL
2 (top), or, if strategic default is su¢ ciently costly it may also be optimal to set ￿ = ￿CH
2
in the region where ￿nancing with ￿ = ￿CL
2 would involve strategic default (bottom).
Propositions 5 and 6 show that it can be e¢ cient to raise the level of credit protection to ￿CH
2
even though this implies that renegotiation will not take place after a liquidity default when the
expected date 2 cash ￿ ow is low. However, it is only e¢ cient to do so when certain conditions are
met. Either it must be the case that the project cannot be ￿nanced when ￿ = ￿CL
2 and that raising
the level of credit protection beyond ￿CL
2 allows the project to attract ￿nancing. This is possible
when CH
2 is su¢ ciently large, as stated in condition (13). Or it must be the case that the costs of
foregone renegotiation are smaller than the costs of strategic default, in which case it is optimal
to choose ￿ = ￿CH
2 also in the region in which ￿nancing with ￿ = ￿CL
2 would involve strategic
default. These cases are illustrated in Figure 3.
To summarize, from an e¢ ciency standpoint it thus is optimal to choose a level of credit
protection of at least ￿CL
2 . This increases the investment opportunity set by increasing pledgeable
income, and it reduces the incidence of strategic defaults for projects that can be ￿nanced in absence
of CDS. Moreover, for projects that cannot be ￿nanced when ￿ = ￿CL
2 , or when strategic default
is particularly costly, it can be optimal to raise the level of protection to ￿CH
2 .
3.2 The Lender￿ s Choice of Credit Insurance
We now turn to the lender￿ s choice of credit protection. We will show that lenders will generally
choose to over-insure relative to the e¢ cient benchmark of Section 3.1, thus becoming to empty
19creditors that are excessively tough from a social perspective.
Consistent with current market practice, we assume that the lender cannot commit ex ante to
a speci￿c level of credit protection. This is reasonable, because credit derivative positions do not
have to be disclosed, such that commitment to a certain level of credit protection is impossible. In
choosing credit protection, the lender will thus take the face value R as given and will then choose
a level of credit protection ￿ that maximizes his individual payo⁄. The fair insurance premium f in
turn correctly anticipates the lender￿ s incentives regarding renegotiation given a level of protection
￿: Note that this also implies that the value of CDS to the lender comes entirely from strengthening
his bargaining power in situations that ultimately do not trigger payment of the CDS. States in
which the CDS pays out are priced into the insurance premium f, which means that in expected
terms the creditor pays one for one for potential payouts from his CDS protection.14
By the same argument as in Section 3.1, we know that the lender will choose a level of credit
protection of at least ￿CL
2 . By doing so, the lender improves his position in renegotiation without
sacri￿cing any renegotiation surplus. However, the lender may have an incentive to raise his level
of credit protection beyond ￿CL
2 to ￿ = ￿CH
2 . In fact, the lender will always do so if the increased
level of credit protection raises his expected payo⁄from owning the debt contract, notwithstanding
any lost renegotiation surplus an increase in credit protection may cause. This means, for example,
that in contrast to the e¢ cient benchmark the lender may have the incentive to raise the level of
credit protection to ￿CH
2 even in cases where the project could be ￿nanced e¢ ciently with ￿ = ￿CL
2 .
This is outlined in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 Suppose that F ￿ e F; such that the project can be ￿nanced without strategic default
by setting ￿ = ￿CL
2 . The lender nevertheless chooses ￿ = ￿CH
2 when this increases his expected
payo⁄. This occurs when CH














This is ine¢ cient because it results in an expected loss of renegotiation surplus of (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿CL
2 .
14We use this property to simplify our calculations. In particular, when calculating the creditor￿ s payo⁄ we only
need to consider states in which default does not occurs, because in expected terms the CDS payment ￿ and the
insurance premium f will exactly o⁄set.
20If in addition there is an interval (e F; e F0] where ￿nancing with ￿ = ￿CL
2 involves strategic
default, the creditor ine¢ ciently chooses ￿ = ￿CH
2 when CH
2 > C2 and in addition ￿ > ￿:
Proposition 7 shows that, in comparison to the e¢ cient benchmark, the lender has an incentive
to over-insure. This is because the lender can increase his payo⁄ by raising the level of credit
protection to ￿CH
2 whenever CH
2 > C2. However, we know from Proposition 5 that it is only e¢ cient
to raise the level of credit protection to ￿CH
2 if the project could not be ￿nanced otherwise, or if the
cost of foregone renegotiation surplus is more than compensated by a gain from eliminating strategic
default. The creditor, however, does not fully internalize the loss in renegotiation surplus that
results from choosing ￿ = ￿CH
2 and over-insures in equilibrium. Our model thus predicts ine¢ cient
empty creditors as an equilibrium outcome of the lender￿ s optimal choice credit protection choice,
even when the CDS market correctly anticipates the creditor￿ s ine¢ cient behavior in renegotiation.
Corollary 4 Assume that the project can be ￿nanced without strategic default by setting ￿ = ￿CL
2 :
The lender will always over-insure (irrespective of the particular values of CH
2 and CL
2 ) when
1. the probability of the high second period cash ￿ow ￿ tends to one;
2. qCH
2 > CL
2 and q ￿ ￿:
On the other hand, there is no overinsurance problem when either ￿ = 0 or q = 0:
The ￿rst part of Corollary 4 shows that ine¢ cient over-insurance by creditors is more likely
when there is a high probability that in the event of a liquidity default there is ample renegotiation
surplus. In this case, the incentive to appropriate as much as possible when the renegotiation
surplus turns out to be high gives creditors an incentive purchase credit insurance up to an amount
that ine¢ ciently precludes renegotiation when C2 = CL
2 : The second part of Corollary 4 shows that
when CH
2 is large relative to CL
2 , it su¢ ces that ￿ exceeds q for the creditor to always over-insure.
This illustrates that ine¢ cient over-insurance by creditors is more likely the higher the ￿ upside
potential￿in renegotiation surplus. Finally, (15) shows that there is no over-insurance problem
when the creditor receives the entire surplus in renegotiation (q = 1), or when the probability of
the high date 2 cash ￿ ow is zero (￿ = 0).
214 Multiple Creditors
In this section we explore an individual creditor￿ s incentive to obtain default insurance in situations
where the ￿rm raises debt from multiple creditors. Most of our results can be stated in the simplest
possible setting with only two creditors. They generalize straightforwardly to situations with an
arbitrary number of n ￿ 2 creditors.
The ￿rm may raise funds from multiple creditors either through a single debt issue to multiple
creditors, or through multiple issues sold to a single creditor each. In the latter situation the
￿rm e⁄ectively renegotiates its debts separately with each creditor, and can treat creditors with
di⁄erent levels of credit protection di⁄erently. In the former situation, the ￿rm will renegotiate
with all holders of a particular issue at once, treating all creditors equally, even if they may not all
be equally insured.
4.1 Two separate debt issues
Suppose for simplicity that the two debt issues are of equal size and seniority, and that each creditor
has purchased ￿i = ￿CL
2 =2 in credit protection, such that the aggregate amount of credit protection,
￿1 +￿2 = ￿CL
2 ; is at the maximum level that allows e¢ cient renegotiation after a liquidity default.
Suppose also that the project can attract ￿nancing when ￿1 + ￿2 = ￿CL
2 ; such that an increase in
credit protection from this level would be ine¢ cient. We will now show that in this situation an
individual creditor is more likely to deviate, by obtaining an ine¢ ciently higher level of insurance,
than the lone creditor in the single creditor case analyzed in the previous section. The basic reason
is that in a setting with multiple creditors, an individual creditor is seeking to strengthen his
bargaining position in renegotiation not just vis-a-vis the debtor, but also with respect to the other
creditors.
In Proposition 7 we established that when a lone creditor chooses his level of credit protection
he will over-insure whenever CH
2 exceeds the threshold C2 de￿ned in Proposition . We will now
show that the threshold for CH
2 at which a single creditor deviates in our symmetric two-creditor
situation is strictly lower. That is, when comparing a single creditor￿ s expected payo⁄from choosing
protection ￿i = ￿CL
2 =2 to the payo⁄ from choosing a strictly higher level of protection, we show
that the latter is strictly higher for a cuto⁄ of CH
2 strictly lower than C2.
22To see this, note that with protection ￿i = ￿CL
















The most pro￿table deviation for an individual creditor is to increase protection to ￿CH
2 ￿ ￿j
(where ￿j = ￿CL
2 =2 is the other creditor￿ s level of protection). In this case the deviating creditor
can extract all the bargaining surplus when C2 = CH
2 and force both the ￿rm and the other creditor
down to their outside options. Increasing protection beyond this level would lead to a breakdown
of renegotiation even when C2 = CH
2 and would thus not be pro￿table. Choosing a lower level
credit protection would leave money on the table for the ￿rm or the other creditor. The deviation
payo⁄ from unilaterally increasing credit protection to ￿CH
2 ￿ ￿CL
2 =2 is given by:
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whenever (17) exceeds (16). Proposition (8) shows that the resulting cuto⁄ value for CH
2 is lower
than the one in the single creditor case. Multiple creditors in separate debt issues thus have a
tendency to worsen the over-insurance problem.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the project can be ￿nanced without strategic default with two debt
issues of equal size and seniority and CDS insurance: ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿
2CL
2 . Then an individual lender























2 is strictly smaller than the cuto⁄ for CH
2 at which a sole creditor switches to the
higher level of insurance ￿ = ￿CH
2 . Therefore, there is a greater likelihood of over-insurance with
multiple creditors in separate issues than with a single creditor.
The intuition for the worsening of the over-insurance problem when there are multiple creditors
in separate issues can be seen by considering the costs and bene￿ts of a unilateral increase in credit
23protection. The individual creditor who unilaterally raises his level of credit protection extracts all
the surplus from the deviation when C2 = CH
2 . The cost of the deviation, on the other hand, is
shared by the two creditors: when C2 = CL
2 renegotiation fails, and both creditors lose ￿CL
2 =2 of
potential renegotiation surplus.
To further compare the multiple creditor case to the single creditor case, it is instructive to
consider the case when q = 1: In this case creditors receive the entire surplus in renegotiation, even
in the absence of CDS. From (15) we know that in this case a lone creditor would have no incentive
to over-insure. In the two-creditor case, on the other hand, over-insurance still emerges even when
q = 1; as shown by condition (18). The reason is that even though creditors jointly receive the
entire renegotiation surplus even absent CDS, one creditor can pro￿t at the expense of the other
creditor by increasing his CDS position.
4.2 One bond issue with multiple creditors
Consider now the situation where the ￿rm has issued a single bond that is held in equal amounts
by two creditors. Unlike in the previous case, the ￿rm is now required to treat the two creditors
equally when it attempts to restructure this bond: It has to o⁄er a debt exchange on the same terms,
irrespective of whether the two creditors have independently purchased the same level of default
protection or not. As a result of this constraint on ex post restructuring o⁄ers, the incentive for
each individual creditor to seek default protection is less clear. For example, if creditor i purchases
protection ￿i, which is anticipated to result in an exchange o⁄er to forestall default of ￿i for each
creditor, then it is redundant for creditor j to also get default protection. Another complication
in this situation is that the two creditors may bene￿t by trading their claims with each other in
anticipation of a debt restructuring. All in all, it is thus not obvious a priori whether the presence
of multiple holders of the same bond issue results in a greater or smaller level of equilibrium default
protection than with a single creditor. We consider in turn the situations where no trade between
the two creditors is allowed, and when both bond and CDS trades are possible in a secondary
market.
244.2.1 No trade among creditors during renegotiation
A ￿rst observation is that in equilibrium one of the two creditors purchases credit protection of
at least ￿i = ￿CL
2 =2. To see this, suppose that the two creditors each purchase less than ￿CL
2 =2
in protection. In that case, it would always be individually pro￿table for one of the creditors to
increase his level of credit protection to ￿i = ￿CL
2 =2. This increase in credit protection raises the
payo⁄s of both creditors (since they are treated equally in renegotiation) without sacri￿cing any
renegotiation surplus. Accordingly, when credit protection is fairly priced, a pair (￿1;￿2) such that
max[￿1;￿2] = ￿CL
2 =2 could be a candidate equilibrium outcome. In what follows, we will focus in
the symmetric candidate equilibrium in which both creditors purchase ￿CL
2 =2 of credit protection.
Consider when it is privately optimal for one of the two creditors to increase his level of credit
protection beyond ￿CL
2 =2. The most pro￿table deviation for an individual creditor is to raise
his level of credit protection up to ￿CH
2 =2. This is the maximum level of protection that allows
renegotiation when the renegotiation surplus is high, given that both creditors have to be treated
equally in renegotiation. Then, assuming that there is no strategic default in equilibrium, the
expected payo⁄ from deviating to ￿i = ￿CH









Equation (19) re￿ ects that under equal treatment a restructuring is possible only if the ￿rm o⁄ers
￿CH
2 =2 to each creditor, which after creditor i￿ s deviation is only possible when the renegotiation
surplus is high, i.e. with probability ￿. When the surplus is low, renegotiation fails and the creditor
receives the CDS payment ￿CH
2 =2. However, in expected terms this payment is o⁄set by the cost
of purchasing CDS protection, which under fair pricing is given by (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿CH
2 =2.
The deviation is pro￿table if (19) exceeds the creditor￿ s payo⁄ when protection is given by
￿i = ￿CL

































This condition is equivalent to the condition that must be satis￿ed for a single creditor to bene￿t
by increasing his level of credit protection beyond ￿ = ￿CL
2 . This means that under a single bond
issue, that is held in equal amounts by two creditors, the incentives to over-insure are equivalent to
those of a single creditor, when creditors cannot trade amongst themselves in a secondary market.
It follows that there is likely to be less ine¢ cient overinsurance under this ￿nancial structure than
when the ￿rm negotiates two separate debt contracts.
4.2.2 Creditors can trade their CDS and bond positions during renegotiation
Consider now the situation where the two creditors can trade their bond and CDS positions before
the ￿rm undertakes debt renegotiations. As we will show, secondary market trade between the
two creditors induces the deviating creditor to be more aggressive in seeking high levels of default
protection.
We start again from the candidate symmetric equilibrium in which both creditors have purchased
￿1 = ￿2 = ￿CL
2 =2 in credit protection, and ask what an individual creditor￿ s incentives are to
deviate by seeking more credit protection. The most pro￿table deviation for creditor i is to raise
his level of credit protection to ￿CH
2 ￿ ￿CL
2 =2. Note that absent trade among the creditors, at
this level of protection renegotiation would fail even if the renegotiation surplus is high: under







renegotiation succeeds, but this would exceed the available renegotiation surplus of ￿CH
2 .
However, when trade is allowed between the two creditors, the deviating creditor can purchase
the other creditor￿ s bond and CDS position to ensure that renegotiation will be successful when the
renegotiation surplus is high. To be able to purchase the other creditor￿ s bond and CDS positions,
the deviating creditor would have to pay the other creditor at least what he would receive if
renegotiation were to fail, i.e. his CDS default payment of ￿CL
2 =2. After purchasing the other
creditor￿ s bond and CDS positions, the deviating creditor negotiates as a single creditor with the
26￿rm and is therefore willing to accept a restructuring o⁄er for the whole bond issue of ￿CH
2 . That
is, if the ￿rm makes an o⁄er of ￿CH
2 =2 for each half of the bond issue, the deviating creditor who
now owns the entire issue will vote to accept this o⁄er on all the bonds he owns. The deviating


















































This is the same condition as the one we derived for the case which two creditors with two separate
bond issues. We thus conclude that the incentives to seek excessive default protection when the ￿rm
has issued a single bond held by multiple creditors lie between the incentives for over-insurance
under ￿nancing with a single creditor, and the incentives for over-insurance when the ￿rm has
written multiple debt contracts with multiple creditors. Given that trading among creditors has
become relatively commonplace, even during times of distress, this second case may be the one that
is empirically more relevant.
5 Discussion and Policy Implications
Our analysis highlights both the positive role of CDS as a commitment device for borrowers, and
the negative, socially ine¢ cient rent extraction they allow lenders to undertake. Both the costs
and bene￿ts of CDS arise from the same economic force: empty creditors￿strengthened bargaining
power in renegotiation.
In this section we discuss the implications of our analysis for policy and the optimal legal treat-
ment of CDS. The existing law literature on CDS and the empty creditor problem (e.g. Hu and
27Black (2008a,b), Lubben (2007)) has mostly been concerned with the potential negative ex-post
consequences of empty creditors. The premise of this literature is that the bundling of economic
ownership and control rights is e¢ cient, and hence that the introduction of CDS results in dis-
tortions, giving rise to ine¢ ciencies. Accordingly, these studies argue that it would generally be
e¢ ciency-enhancing to mitigate or undo the separation of cash ￿ ow and control rights e⁄ected
through CDS, thereby eliminating the empty creditor problem. Usually, the focus in on interven-
tions in the bankruptcy process, i.e. once a ￿rm is in Chapter 11. It is argued, in particular, that
it would be e¢ cient for bankruptcy courts to require disclosure of CDS positions to be able to
uncover potential con￿ icts of interest between those creditors in a given class that are protected by
a CDS and those who are not:
￿This disclosure would ensure that the court, other creditors, and shareholders know
where a creditor￿ s economic interest lies. Even if an apparent creditor with negative net
economic interest in a class of debt retained voting rights, its views would be discounted.
Moreover, courts would likely be readier to override a creditor vote which was tainted by
some creditors voting with little, no, or negative economic ownership.￿ , Hu and Black
(2008a), pp.21
Thus, according to Hu and Black (2008a), one e⁄ect of disclosure of CDS positions would be
the ability to reduce or remove the empty creditor￿ s control rights and to leave the restructuring
decisions in the hands of the unprotected creditors:
￿Voting rights may need to be limited to creditors with positive economic interest in
the debtor as a whole or in a particular debt class. The degree of voting rights may need
to be based on net economic ownership instead of gross ownership of a debt class.￿ , Hu
and Black (2008a), pp.2115
However, given the form of most CDS contracts, it is not obvious that a con￿ ict between
protected and unprotected creditors always remains in bankruptcy, as the CDS payment is a bygone
15They suggest further that ￿it might be feasible to adopt crude rules that block voting with negative overall
economic interest ￿either in the debtor or in a particular class. At least in the U.S., bankruptcy courts may have the
power under current law to disregard or limit votes by empty creditors, if disclosure rules made it possible for them
to identify these creditors.￿That is, ￿courts can disallow votes that are "not in good faith." (U.S. Bankruptcy Code
§ 1126)￿ .
28once the ￿rm is in Chapter 11 and CDS contracts have been settled.16 Thus, the focus on disclosure
and on denying voting rights to protected creditors in bankruptcy may be misplaced. Our analysis
suggests that the critical legal intervention is likely to be prior to the bankruptcy ￿ling, with a focus
on eliminating ine¢ cient obstacles to debt restructuring outside of Chapter 11, while preserving
the commitment bene￿ts of CDS.
We divide our policy discussion into six main subsections. The ￿rst two cover in turn situations
where from an e¢ ciency standpoint CDS are likely to be harmless and mostly harmful. The last
four subsections cover the issues of: i) whether it would be e¢ cient to make debt restructuring a
credit event; ii) whether it would be e¢ cient for the protection seller to become the debt claimholder
before or after a default; iii) the possibility of ex-post intervention by the protection seller should
renegotiation fail; and (iv) the bene￿ts of mandating disclosure of CDS positions.
5.1 When are CDS likely to be harmless?
Given that in our analysis CDS lead to ex-ante commitment bene￿ts by strengthening creditors￿
ex-post bargaining power, it would be ine¢ cient to remove the creditor￿ s voting rights unless CDS
give rise to signi￿cant ex-post debt restructuring ine¢ ciencies. Thus, as a general principle it
would be e¢ cient for courts to uphold a creditor￿ s voting rights in a debt restructuring proposal
or exchange o⁄er, unless it can be shown that the CDS protection is likely to lead to a breakdown
in a value-enhancing debt restructuring deal. It would be ine¢ cient if the mere presence of CDS
protection led to an automatic denial of voting rights. In particular, if the e⁄ect of CDS protection
is only to change the terms of the restructuring deal in favor of the creditor, then there is no reason
to intervene either in the debt contract or the CDS, since in this case, the denial of voting rights
to hedged creditors would erode the ex-ante bene￿ts of CDS that we highlight in this article.
When would we expect the commitment bene￿ts of CDS to be largest? Since the bene￿ts of
CDS stem from an increase in the creditor￿ s bargaining power, they are particularly large when
absent CDS creditors have limited bargaining power, i.e. when q is low. This is likely to be the case
16Clearly, once all CDS are settled, they should not matter in Chapter 11. It is possible, however, that important
decisions￿ in particular whether to grant DIP-￿nancing￿ have to be made before all CDS contracts are settled. To
the extent that the default payment by the protection seller is una⁄ected, these decisions should not depend on the
presence of unsettled CDS. If, however, the default payment is inversely related to the recovery (or continuation)
value of the ￿rm in Chapter 11, protected creditors may have a lower incentive to maximize continuation value. From
this perspective it is desirable to settle CDS positions as quickly as possible after a Chapter 11 ￿ling.
29when creditors are unsecured, and when the debtor￿ s assets are mostly intangible. On the other
hand, when the creditors￿bargaining power is strong even absent CDS, the commitment bene￿ts
are likely to be smaller. This is more likely when creditors are secured and when the ￿rm￿ s assets
are mostly tangible.
It is also important to note that from an e¢ ciency perspective our model provides no grounds
for limiting speculative ￿ naked￿positions in CDS markets. Since in our model the harmful e⁄ects
of CDS on renegotiation can only arise through investors who hold both the bond and the CDS,
speculation in CDS markets does not cause any ine¢ ciency (at least in terms of a potential ine¢ cient
empty creditor problem) as long as the speculators active in these markets do not at the same time
own the CDS and the underlying bond. It is not necessary to sacri￿ce the role of CDS markets in
aggregating market participants￿information on credit default probabilities in order to deal with
ine¢ cient empty creditors. In our model there are thus no e¢ ciency gains from limiting ￿ naked￿
CDS positions, although in practice there may be other reasons, outside our model, for considering
such a policy.
On the other hand, our analysis indicates that regulators may want to keep an eye on trading
strategies that involve joint positions in bonds and CDS, for example so-called negative basis trades
that aim to take advantage of relative price di⁄erences between a cash bond and a synthetic bond,
comprised of a risk-free bond and a CDS. In fact, Yavorsky (2009) predict that the increasing popu-
larity of negative basis arbitrage trades, which involve positions in a CDS and the underlying bond,
may lead to increased and accelerated bankruptcies or restructurings (in cases when restructuring
counts a credit event) over the coming years.
5.2 When are CDS mostly harmful?
When a ￿rm￿ s debt capacity is large enough that it could secure a loan from an unprotected creditor,
or from a creditor protected by a CDS with a low default payment, but instead the creditor takes
out a CDS insurance with a default payment so high that the CDS gives rise to an ine¢ cient
breakdown in debt restructuring, then clearly the CDS is harmful. As stated in Proposition 7,
the CDS then gives rise to socially ine¢ cient rent extraction by the creditor at the expense of the
overall value of the ￿rm.
More generally, our analysis suggests that when a CDS speci￿es a default payment that is
30disproportionately large relative to the creditor￿ s loss in default, for a ￿rm that was perceived to be
su¢ ciently pro￿table to be able to obtain more loans ex ante, then prima facie the main purpose
of such a CDS is ine¢ cient rent extraction. Intervention to limit such CDS is desirable from an
e¢ ciency perspective, but it is not entirely clear what form this intervention should take.
Should it take the form of disenfranchising holders of CDS contracts of their voting rights in a
debt restructuring, as Hu and Black (2008a) suggest? Or should it take the form of limiting the
enforcement of excessively large default payments? Clearly, when there is only one creditor involved,
it does not make sense to disenfranchise the creditor. In such situations, intervention must take the
form of directly limiting the enforcement of CDS contracts. For example, a limit on a maximum
allowable default payment may be welfare improving. In the case of multiple creditors, on the other
hand, reducing voting rights of creditors with a disproportionate amount of protection may lower
the incentive to overinsure. Another avenue of intervention could be to require that enforcement
could be made conditional on the borrower and lender both agreeing to the CDS contract. This
would limit unilateral, rent-seeking default protection purchased by the creditor at the expense of
the ￿rm. However, this intervention would require detailed disclosure of CDS positions, which we
discuss further below.
5.3 The consequences of making debt restructuring a credit event
We have so far assumed that out-of-court debt restructuring does not constitute a credit event for
the CDS contract. This corresponds broadly to current market practice, as the standard North
American CDS as de￿ned by ISDA does not count restructuring as a credit event (JPMorgan
(2009)). However, there are also CDS contracts that include restructuring as a credit event.17
While it is well-known that the di⁄erent treatment of restructuring events a⁄ects the pricing of
CDS contracts (Packer and Zhu (2005), Berndt, Jarrow, and Kang (2006)), our model implies that
in addition this contractual di⁄erence also has important repercussions on creditor behavior and
17In fact, restructuring was originally included as a credit event in the 1999 ISDA credit derivatives de￿nitions.
However problems with restructuring clauses emerged when Conseco Finance restructured debt to terms that were
advantageous to creditors, yet still this restructuring counted as a credit event. As a consequence, contracts that did
not include restructuring as a credit event gained in popularity. Moreover, for investors that wanted restructuring
included in their CDS contracts, ISDA introduced modi￿ed versions of the restructuring clause. The modi￿ed
restructuring clause of 2001 (Mod-R) and the modi￿ed-modi￿ed restructuring clause introduced in 2003 (Mod-Mod-
R) limit the set of securities a lender can deliver in the case of a restructuring credit event. For more details on the
di⁄erent contractual clauses see JPMorgan (2006).
31credit market outcomes. In particular, making restructuring a credit event constitutes one simple
way of eliminating the empty creditor problem altogether, since the default payment ￿ would be
made whether or not debt restructuring is successful. Hence, when restructuring constitutes a
credit event the CDS has no e⁄ect on the creditor￿ s incentives in debt restructuring and this would
therefore eliminate the empty creditor problem.
However, recall that in our model the economic value added by CDS stems from their role as a
commitment device. In particular, a creditor with CDS protection becomes a tougher counterparty
in renegotiations when the CDS contract does not trigger a default payment upon an out-of-court
restructuring agreement, and only triggers a payment when the debtor formally defaults on his debt
obligations by, say, ￿ling for Chapter 11 protection. It follows that if restructuring is included as a
credit event, the CDS loses its economic role in our model. Hence, while classifying restructuring
as a credit event eliminates restructuring ine¢ ciencies resulting from the empty creditor problem,
it also eliminates any economic gains from CDS as a commitment device.
A related way around the empty creditor problem would be to structure CDS like a put option.
Rather than requiring a contractually speci￿ed default event, one could imagine a contract according
to which the protection buyer can sell (put) the bond to the protection seller for a prespeci￿ed price
at any time. In this case again, the presence of CDS would have no e⁄ect on debt restructuring.
However, as with debt restructuring as a credit event, the put option CDS would also eliminate the
bene￿cial commitment role of CDS.
5.4 Who is best placed to renegotiate debt?
Should the CDS involve a simple default payment ￿, as we have assumed, or should it also involve
a transfer of the debt claim to the protection seller? In our baseline model we have normalized the
reorganization value in Chapter 11 to L = 0 and assumed that, according to the absolute priority
rule, all the reorganization surplus goes to the lender. In this baseline case it is therefore irrelevant
whether the protection seller becomes the owner of the debt in the event of default or not. But,
suppose more generally that L > 0 and that the lender is only able to appropriate a share q of this
reorganization surplus. Then the debt claim should be transferred to the party that is best placed
to negotiate with the debtor in Chapter 11. If the protection seller￿ s bargaining power qI is higher
than the creditor￿ s bargaining power q; then there are obviously gains from trade in transferring
32the debt claim to the protection seller, who can extract a bigger share of the reorganization surplus
L. If this transfer is anticipated at date 0, it is welfare-enhancing since it raises the ￿rm￿ s debt
capacity and thus facilitates investment. In the terminology of derivatives markets, in cases where
the insurance company that issues CDS has su¢ cient specialization in Chapter 11 negotiations,
￿ physical settlement,￿in which the bond is transferred to the protection seller when default occurs,
may thus be more e¢ cient than ￿ cash settlement,￿under which the protection buyer retains the
bond in default.
Is there also an e¢ ciency gain from transferring ownership of the debt to the insurance company
before default occurs? In contrast to a transfer of the bond once in Chapter 11, by selling the bond
to the protection seller before a default, the initial lender would undermine the commitment value
of the CDS. Indeed, the debtor then renegotiates the debt directly with the insurance company,
which does not have the outside option from CDS protection in renegotiation. Thus it is only if
the di⁄erence in bargaining strengths between the original debtholders and the insurance company
is large enough to more than compensate for the lost outside option ￿, that it is unambiguously
attractive for the initial lender to sell his debt claim before default. However, transfer of ownership
before may be e¢ cient when the original lender and the debtor fail to renegotiate. We discuss this
possibility in the next section.
5.5 Ex-post interventions by the protection seller
Up to now we have assumed that the protection seller remains passive when the debtor and creditor
renegotiate, e⁄ectively ruling out Coasian dynamics that may alleviate the ine¢ ciencies caused by
empty creditors. In this subsection we discuss how active involvement by the protection seller may
reduce the ine¢ ciencies created by CDS.
One avenue for the protection seller to avoid default, and the CDS payment of ￿ = ￿CH
2 to
the creditor, is to directly help the debtor repay the debt obligation R at date 1. If the protection
seller fears an ine¢ cient breakdown in renegotiation, all he needs to do is cover the di⁄erence
R ￿ CL
1 of the debt obligation. Hence, as long as R ￿ CL
1 ￿ ￿CH
2 this is an attractive alternative
for the protection seller. In fact, the Texan brokerage ￿rm Amherst Holdings pursued exactly this
strategy to avoid default payments on CDS contracts it had sold to investment banks such as J.P.
33Morgan Chase, Royal Bank of Scotland and Bank of America.18 Our analysis suggests that such
interventions are e¢ ciency-improving ex post.
An alternative way for the protection seller to avoid the ine¢ ciency that arises from the failure
to renegotiate is to purchase the debt claim from the protection buyer in cases where renegotiation
between the debtor and creditor breaks down. In order to examine this in the context of our
model, recall that debt renegotiation breaks down when the CDS speci￿es a high default payment,
￿ = ￿CH
2 ; and when C2 = CL
2 ; such that the available renegotiation surplus is given by ￿CL
2 . If
the protection seller purchases the debt claim from the initial lender there will be e¢ cient debt
renegotiation and therefore no default by the ￿rm. This means that the initial lender would be
denied the default payment ￿ = ￿CH
2 under the CDS. Thus, to purchase the debt claim, the
protection seller must pay the initial lender at least this amount. Then, by renegotiating with the
￿rm, the protection seller can receive qI￿CL
2 . The net payment the protection seller needs to make
if he purchases the debt claim is thus given by ￿CH
2 ￿ qI￿CL
2 . If the protection seller does not
purchase the debt claim, renegotiation will fail and the protection seller has to make a payment on
the outstanding CDS of ￿ = ￿CH
2 : This suggests a potential role for protection sellers to purchase
outstanding debt in cases when renegotiation between the debtor and the original creditor fails.
However, while we have seen protection sellers making direct payments to avoid default on
issues, we are not aware of cases in which insurance companies have bought up the outstanding
debt of an issuer in order to avoid a breakdown of renegotiation. It is an open question whether
this is the case because protection sellers are not taking a su¢ ciently active role to avoid ine¢ cient
defaults due to empty creditors, or whether there are other di¢ culties, such as locating the holders
of the debt, that prevent this intervention in practice. Finally, a key issue with both types of
ex-post intervention described here is whether they do not undermine the CDS market altogether,
or lead to opportunistic behavior by the ￿rm or the initial creditor, thereby leading to an ex-ante
welfare loss.
18See ￿A Daring Trade Has Wall Street Seething: Texas Brokerage Firm Outwits the Big Banks in a Mortgage-
Related Deal, and Now It￿ s War," Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2009.
345.6 Disclosure
According to current market practice, there are few disclosure requirements for bond positions and
almost no disclosure requirements for CDS positions. Prior to a Chapter 11 ￿ling neither bond nor
CDS positions have to be disclosed. Once in Chapter 11, rule 2019(a) requires ad-hoc committees
to disclose their security positions, but usually not their derivatives positions.
However, the current debate about moving CDS to organized exchanges (see for example Du¢ e
and Zhu (2009) and Stulz (2009)) has gone hand in hand with a debate on transparency and poten-
tial disclosure requirements for CDS positions (although strictly speaking a central clearinghouse
is not necessary for disclosure, which could also be mandated in OTC markets). While much of the
debate on disclosure has focused on the ability to identify risk concentrations, our model highlights
another potential bene￿t of CDS position disclosure: Requiring disclosure may allow market partic-
ipants to contract on CDS positions. Speci￿cally, in our model this may allow the lender to commit
not to over-insure once he has acquired the bond, thus overcoming the empty creditor problem.
Moreover, even if such commitment to CDS positions is not possible, public disclosure of CDS po-
sitions would allow the public to gauge creditors￿incentives when the ￿rm is in distress. Note that
in our analysis this type of disaggregated disclosure to facilitate contracting or gauge renegotiation
incentives would only need to apply to investors who simultaneously hold the underlying bond or
loan.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a limited commitment model of credit default swaps. While many com-
mentators have raised concerns about the ex-post ine¢ ciency of the empty-creditor problem that
arises when a debt-holder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control
rights, our analysis shows that credit default swaps add value by acting as a commitment device
for borrowers to pay out cash. Hence, CDS have important ex-ante commitment bene￿ts. Specif-
ically, they increase investment and, by eliminating strategic default, can make existing projects
more e¢ cient. However, we also show that when creditors are free to choose their level of credit
protection, they will generally over-insure, resulting in an empty creditor problem that is ine¢ cient
ex-post and ex-ante. This over-insurance occurs even when CDS markets perfectly anticipate the
35ine¢ cient behavior of empty creditors, and leads to excessive incidence of bankruptcy and too little
renegotiation with creditors relative to ￿rst best.
Our analysis leads to a more nuanced view on policy than most of the existing law and eco-
nomics literature. In particular, any policy response to ine¢ ciencies arising from the empty creditor
problem should be mindful of the bene￿cial commitment role of CDS. Eliminating empty credi-
tors altogether, for example by stripping protected creditors of their voting rights or by making
restructuring a credit event, would be ine¢ cient in our framework. An approach that may avoid
such ine¢ ciencies would be to cap enforceable CDS payments or to make CDS positions subject
to approval by both the debtor and the creditor. Moreover, disclosure of CDS positions may help
alleviate the problem by allowing debtors and creditors to contract on CDS positions taken by
creditors.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that e F ￿ e F0 and consider a project whose setup cost exceeds e F:
This project cannot be ￿nanced when setting ￿ = ￿CL
2 : Increasing the amount of credit protection
to ￿ = ￿CH
2 is e¢ cient if it allows the project to receive ￿nancing. This is the case if increasing
the amount of credit protection to ￿CH
2 increases the amount the ￿rm can pledge to the creditor
relative to the case where ￿ = CL
2 . When ￿ = ￿CL
2 the ￿rm can pledge












to the creditor, where the face value of debt is set to the highest value compatible with no strategic
default in the high cash ￿ ow state, R = CL
2 : By setting ￿ = ￿CH
2 ; the creditor expects to receive
￿R + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿CH
2 ; (26)
where again R = CL
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Proof of Proposition 6: Suppose that e F0 > e F: Clearly, when setting ￿ = ￿CH
2 allows
￿nancing a project that could otherwise not be ￿nanced (F > e F0), it is optimal to do so. This is
the case when the maximum pledgeable cash ￿ ow with ￿ = ￿CH


























In addition, if the cost of foregone renegotiation surplus, (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿CL
2 ; is smaller than the
cost of strategic default, ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)CL
2 ; it is optimal to set ￿ = ￿CH
2 and R = CL
2 also on the
interval (e F; e F0] to eliminate strategic default, as long as this allows ￿nancing. This is possible as
long as F < ￿CL
2 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿CH
2 : Comparing the two expressions above, it is easy to see that the
cost of foregone renegotiation surplus is smaller then the cost of strategic default when ￿ > ￿:
Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose that F ￿ e F such that e¢ cient ￿nancing is possible with
￿ = ￿CL
2 . The creditor will nevertheless choose ￿ = ￿CH
2 when this increases his expected payo⁄.








+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿CL
2 ; (29)
which yields the same condition on CH
2 as in Proposition 5. The crucial di⁄erence to Proposition
5 is that the creditor will choose to increase his level of credit protection to ￿CH
2 if it increases his
expected payo⁄, irrespective of whether the project can be ￿nanced when ￿ = ￿CL
2 : Now consider
F 2 (e F; e F0]: When this interval is non-empty, the project can only be ￿nanced with strategic
default when ￿ = ￿CL
2 . If the project could be ￿nanced without strategic default when ￿ = ￿CH
2 ;
it is e¢ cient to do so when the costs of strategic default outweigh the cost of lost renegotiation
surplus, which is the case when ￿ > ￿: In that case the ￿rm can issue debt with face value of
R = CL
2 . Creditors will respond by setting ￿ = ￿CH
2 and willingly fund the project. However,
when ￿ < ￿ the ￿rm will issue debt with face value R = CH
2 : In this case it would be e¢ cient
for creditors to choose ￿ = ￿CL
2 on the interval F 2 (e F; e F0]: However, creditors will ine¢ ciently
37choose ￿ = ￿CH
2 when this increases their payo⁄, which following the same steps as above is the
case whenever (15) holds.
Proof of Corollary 4: The ￿rst assertion is a direct consequence of taking the limit ￿ ! 1 in










2 converges to one. In both cases this implies that the condition for over-insurance
is always satis￿ed since CH
2 > CL
2 > 0: The second assertion of the corollary comes from the fact
that when qCH
2 > CL
2 over-insurance will always occur when the cuto⁄ CH
2 needs to lie above for
over-insurance to occur is smaller than the lowest possible value CH
2 can take in this case (1
qCL
2 ).





2 , which simpli￿es to q < ￿: The cases ￿ = 0 and q = 1 follow
straightforwardly from (15).
Proof of Proposition 8: (17) exceeds (16) when
1
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such that over-insurance is more likely in the two-creditor case. When qCH
2 > CL
2 we know from
(??) that a sole creditor would always over-insure when
1￿￿
(1￿q)￿ ￿ 1. The relevant case to compare is
thus when
1￿￿
(1￿q)￿ > 1 () ￿ < 1





2 . In the two-creditor case an individual creditor deviates from the low level of













38where the last step uses ￿ < 1
2￿q:
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